

THE FOUNDATION OF UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT: 1969-1979

THESIS

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

AFIT/GLM/LAL/95S-12

THE FOUNDATION OF UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT: 1969-1979

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Captain, USAF

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Donald S. Massey

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Abstract

This study sought to identify the role of U.S. foreign policy in shaping Egypt's transition from Soviet economic and military aid to U.S. security assistance from 1969 to 1979 and the factors shaping that transition. An historical analysis of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations and their foreign policy towards Egypt and the Middle East during this period was employed to complete this study. The researcher determined that U.S. diplomacy and dialogue in negotiating an Egyptian-Israeli peace resulted in the end to Soviet economic and military aid to Egypt. During the negotiating process, U.S. economic and military aid served as both reward and enticement as Egypt moved towards peace with Israel. The trickle of U.S. security assistance became a torrent when Egypt signed a permanent peace treaty with Israel. Signed in 1979, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signaled the end to Soviet involvement in Egypt and the beginning of large scale U.S. security assistance. The factors motivating three presidential administrations during this period were countering Soviet influence in the region, reducing or eliminating the prospects of further Arab-Israeli conflict, and maintaining a secure, steady flow of oil from the region for the U.S. and its allies.

THE FOUNDATION OF UNITED STATES

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

TO EGYPT: 1969-1979

I. Introduction

Chapter Overview

This chapter introduces the United States (U.S.) security assistance program as the general issue of this thesis and U.S. security assistance to Egypt from 1969 through 1979 as the specific issue of interest. This chapter then presents three investigative questions that serve as the framework for this study. Chapter I concludes by clarifying the scope of this research.

General Issue

Security assistance is a group of programs through which the U.S. provides defense related articles, training, and other services to foreign governments in the interest of U.S. national policies and objectives (DISAM, 1995: 719). Security assistance has played a vital role in U.S. foreign policy since its inception by President Truman in 1947. President Ronald Reagan highlighted the importance of a viable security assistance program during his February 1985 "State of the Union Address" before Congress:

> We cannot play innocents in a world that is not innocent. Nor can we be passive when freedom is under siege. Without resources, diplomacy cannot succeed. Our security assistance programs help friendly governments defend themselves, and give them confidence to work for peace....Dollar for dollar security assistance contributes as much to global security as our own defense budget.
>
> (DISAM, 1995: 23)

The apparent ease with which coalition forces were able to deploy, integrate and support the objectives of United Nations' resolutions following the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 adds credence to President Reagan's assessment of security assistance (DISAM, 1995: 25). During the Gulf War, Egypt contributed over 35,000 military members, the third largest military contingent, and helped forge a consensus for active participation in the coalition among conservative Arab nations in the region (DOS and DSAA, 1993: 158). Egyptian leaders clearly demonstrated their commitment to bilateral military relationships established during nearly fourteen years of U.S. security assistance.

Specific Issue

The Near East and South Asia regions have been the dominant recipients of U.S. security assistance since the early 1970s (Burke, 1989: 111). Since 1976, Egypt alone has secured almost $15 billion in foreign military sales agreements from the United States (DSAA, 1993: 98). Such large scale assistance has helped foster close U.S.-Egyptian ties and promote Egyptian-Israeli peace. However, such close U.S.-Egyptian relations have not always been the case. Prior to 1976, Egypt received the bulk of its military and economic aid from the Soviet Union. Egypt was the recipient of the Soviet Union's first major arms sale in the Middle East in September 1955, worth approximately $400 million (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 124). Between 1967 and 1976, Egypt received over $2.3 billion in arms from the Soviet Union, more than any other noncommunist developing country during the same period (Kanet, 1983: 49).

The purpose of this research is to identify the role United States foreign policy played in shaping Egypt's transition from Soviet military assistance to U.S. security assistance from 1969 through 1979 and the factors shaping that transition. The three investigative questions that serve as the framework for this research follow.

Investigative Questions

1. What factors shaped U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East from 1969 to 1979?

2. What were the objectives of U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt from 1969 to 1979?

3. How did U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and Egypt shape security assistance to Egypt?

Scope

This study traces the foundations of U.S. security assistance to Egypt from 1969 through the end of 1979. As stated earlier, this period coincides with the end of the Soviet Union as Egypt's primary source of military aid and the beginning of large scale U.S. security assistance to Egypt (Kanet, 1983: 49; DSAA, 1993: 98). Emphasis is placed on the monetary level of security assistance rather than the numbers and types of systems provided. However, occasional references to particular weapon systems are used to assist the reader in conceptualizing the scope of assistance provided. Those portions of Egypt's history relating to military development and political focus in the Middle East are presented as background material. This research does not attempt to address all aspects of U.S.-Egyptian relations, particularly those in the field of politics not related to security assistance. This study contains no classified information.

Summary

This chapter introduced the study's general issue, the U.S. security assistance program, and specific issue of interest, the foundation of U.S. security assistance to Egypt. This chapter then presented three investigative questions that shape the direction of this study. Chapter I concluded with clarification of the scope of this research.

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the U.S. security assistance program. Next, the chapter presents a discussion of U.S. interests and foreign policy in the Middle East, followed by a brief history of Egypt. Chapter II concludes with a discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet involvement in Egypt.

Security Assistance

Security assistance is a group of programs through which the United States provides defense assistance, economic support, and the transfer or sale of defense articles to foreign governments in the interest of U.S. national policies (DOS and DSAA, 1993: 4). Often described as an umbrella term due to its legislative, budgetary, program, and Department of Defense (DoD) perspectives, security assistance has played a vital foreign policy role in advancing U.S. interests in a global environment (DISAM, 1995: 37-39, 47). Six major programs are at the heart of U.S. security assistance.

Foreign Military Sales Program and Foreign Military Construction Sales Program. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a program through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services, and training from the U.S. government. Articles and services provided under FMS can be provided from current DoD inventories or from new procurement. Foreign Military Construction Sales (FMCS) involves the sale of design and construction services to eligible purchasers. Sales agreements and sales procedures are similar for both of these non-appropriated programs (DISAM, 1995: 43).

Foreign Military Financing Program. The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), authorized under Sections 23 and 24 of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA), serves to provide military equipment, services and training to American allies

and friendly nations on a credit basis (grants and loans) in order to wean them from grant aid to cash purchases. In FY 1990, the U.S. Congress merged Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding, which had served as the bulwark of security assistance since the Truman administration, into the FMFP (DISAM, 1995: 43-44).

Direct Commercial Sales. Direct commercial sales (DCS) by U.S. manufacturers to foreign buyers are not administered by the DoD and do not involve direct agreements between governments. Authorized under Section 38 of the AECA, governmental control is exerted through licensing by the Office of Defense Trade Control in the Department of State (DISAM, 1995: 44-45).

International Military Education and Training Program. Originally part of the MAP program, the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) began receiving separate authorization in FY 1976. IMET brings foreign military officers to U.S. locations or to overseas U.S. military facilities for educational and technical training. Historically a modest program in terms of cost, in recent years the program has received increasing emphasis as program advocates stress the long term advantages of teaching foreign officers American political values (DISAM, 1995: 45).

Economic Support Fund. The Economic Support Fund (ESF), previously known as Security Support Assistance, Supporting Assistance, and Defense Support, provides economic assistance to American allies and friendly nations based on national security criteria. ESF is designed to promote economic and political stability in areas of interest to the U.S. and to serve as an aid in securing peace or to avert major economic or political crises. Managed by the Agency for International Development, ESF was originally authorized under the 1951 Mutual Security Act. ESF provides aid as balance of payment transfers, commodity import credits, and support for health, education, agriculture, and family planning (DISAM, 1995: 46).

Peacekeeping Operations. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) provides funds for voluntary U.S. contributions to international peacekeeping operations. Authorized by Chapter 6 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act, PKO funds have been used to support such actions as international peacekeeping operations in Cyprus and the Middle East (DISAM, 1995: 47).

Just as the programs comprising security assistance have changed over the years, the precise goals of security assistance have evolved over time to reflect changes in U.S. foreign policy. During the Cold War the emphasis was on supporting "friendly" countries bordering the Soviet Union and China. More recently, security assistance has been targeted towards enhancing the security of friendly Third World nations located in potential trouble spots throughout the globe, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

U.S. Interests and Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Prior to World War II, the United States had relatively minor contact with, or interest in, the countries of the Middle East. There had been some private commercial interests in the region that were involved primarily in oil, tobacco and foreign trade. American missionaries, educators and archeologists had been active in the region since the middle of the nineteenth century. However, by the mid 1940s the strategic value of the region's vast oil reserves had become the single most important reason for increased U.S. involvement in the Middle East. The region's oil reserves and strategic location on air and sea routes between Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Far East thrust the Middle East to greater prominence with the advent of the Cold War (Peretz, 1994: 2). Figure 2.1 contains a map highlighting Egypt's strategic location in the Middle East.



Figure 2.1 Egypt's Strategic Location (Maps on File, 1992: 0.0008)

The Truman Doctrine formed the basis of global national security policy during the Cold War era. The doctrine declared that the United States had the right to help other nations as necessary in order to prevent entire regions from falling under Communist influence (Landau, 1988: 36). President Harry Truman regarded the Middle East as an area of strategic significance. During a presidential address in April 1946, Truman referred to the Middle East as "containing vast natural resources and comprising an area of strategic importance" (Murphy, 1970: 27). The region's special attributes--the source of two-thirds of the West's oil reserves, the Suez Canal, and the location of important British military bases--were seen as vital to national security should there be a global test of strength (Brown, 1983: 77).

The next major statement of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East came during an address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower before a joint session of Congress

on 5 January 1957. This statement, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine and incorporated into a House Joint Resolution, was more specific in language towards the Middle East than the Truman Doctrine of a decade earlier. The Eisenhower Doctrine declared that,

> ...the U.S. considered the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Middle Eastern nations as vital to American security, and that we were prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or nations requesting assistance against armed aggressions from any country controlled by international communism. (Congress, 1957: 816-817)

Increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East, especially with regard to Syria and Egypt, served as the catalyst for the Eisenhower Doctrine. As was the case with the Truman Doctrine, the containment of international Communism and the stability of oil supplies for the West served as the basis for the Eisenhower Doctrine and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East (DISAM, 1995: 15).

During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the Middle East continued to be an area warranting significant attention. Conflicts between the Arabs and Israelis, as well as growing difficulties between Iraq and Iran, threatened regional stability. In January 1964, Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, outlined five U.S. objectives in the Middle East during a major foreign policy address.

> First, as a fundamental contribution to peace, we are concerned with helping create some political stability in the Middle East. Second, we are concerned to limit Soviet influence in the area. Third, there should be an accommodation between Israel and its Arab neighbors which we believe is the only way in which the area as a whole can develop political stability, self-sustained economic growth and thus true independence. Fourth, the continued flow of oil at economically reasonable rates to Western Europe is of great importance and essential to free world strength. Fifth, access to the air and sea routes to and through the Middle East is important to us commercially and militarily. (Murphy, 1970: 29)

However, pursuit of these five Middle East objectives were to become secondary to increasing U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the war in Vietnam. It would not be

until the Nixon Administration and the end of the Vietnam War that the U.S. would assume a more active role in the Middle East.

Five interrelated problems have challenged U.S. foreign policy makers in the Middle East since the end of World War II. These problems consist of the Arab-Israeli conflict, difficulties caused by inter-Arab disputes, oil imports, Soviet efforts at penetration, and building Persian Gulf stability (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 335). Because of these five persistent problems, U.S. interests in the Middle East have remained fundamentally the same despite Presidential differences in style or focus. The first and foremost interest has been preventing control of the region by any hostile power. The second U.S. interest has been to prevent regional disputes from escalating to nuclear confrontation. The next interest has been ensuring U.S. and friendly nation's access to oil in the region at reasonable prices. The last U.S. interest has been to minimize regional instability and its negative consequences (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 334).

Modern Egypt (Russell, 1993: 61-65)

Egypt occupies 386,873 square miles and, with a population of over 58 million, is the most populous Arab nation. Over a quarter of the population lives in the ancient Delta city of Alexandria and the capital city of Cairo. Figure 2.2 contains a map of Egypt. Despite its strategic location at the junction of Africa and Asia, only 3.5 percent of the land is arable--the Nile Valley, the Delta and a few oases. Arabic is the official language, with English and French commonly used in schools and businesses. The two principle religions are Sunni Islam (90 percent) and Coptic Christianity.

Despite systematic attempts to modernize the country's industry and agricultural potential, Egypt has one of the lowest standards of living in the Arab world. A rapidly growing population, few natural resources, and poor governmental economic policies have exacerbated this low standard of living. As of 1993, Egypt's principal trading partners

were the United States, France, Greece, Japan, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. Chief commercial products include tourism, Suez Canal usage, petroleum and refined products, military equipment, cotton and textiles, and small-scale manufacturing. Agriculture, once the basis of the Egyptian economy, has suffered due to governmental regulations and unforeseen environmental problems brought about by the Aswan Dam. Once a leader in education in the Arab world, Egypt has lost its lead largely due to financial limitations.



Figure 2.2 Egypt (Maps on File, 1992: 1.012)

Bordered on the West by Libya, the South by Sudan, across the Red Sea by Saudi Arabia, and the Northeast by Israel, Egypt has had a turbulent past. A part of the Ottoman Empire since 1517, Egypt fell under the control of the French from 1798 to 1801. Although still a part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt became increasingly independent from Istanbul. Financial irresponsibility on the part of a succession of Egyptian rulers resulted in the British seizing control of the country to "protect" European investments, particularly the Suez Canal which was completed in 1869. Egypt remained under British control from 1882 to 1914. With the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Great Britain and Egypt became a protectorate of the British in 1914. Rising unrest at British rule resulted in the British ending the protectorate and granting Egypt independence in 1923.

Waning British influence, governmental corruption and rivalry between nationalistic groups marked the years between 1923 and 1952. The renaming of Sultan Fu´ad to King Fu´ad in 1923 signaled the beginning of the Egyptian monarchy. Inept in political matters, King Fu´ad did little to stem the political corruption and rising dissatisfaction among ordinary Egyptians. King Faruq, whose reign began in 1937, faced growing unrest as conditions for all but the monarchy failed to improve. In 1952, a group of army officers calling themselves the "Free Officers," took control of the country and exiled the monarchy. In 1954 Gamel Abdel Nasser became President of Egypt and became a prominent representative among the Arab world. Nasser advocated Arab nationalism, socialism, neutrality between the superpowers, and support of the Palestinian fight against Israel. In 1955, Nasser purchased arms from the Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia and gained economic assistance from the Kremlin after the U.S. withheld aid for construction of the Aswan Dam. After Nasser's death of a heart attack in 1972, Vice President Anwar Sadat came to power. President Sadat would become one of the

key players in Egypt's transition to U.S. security assistance and in seeking an end to Egypt's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

The struggle of two peoples, Palestinian Arabs and Jews, to exist in the land of their ancestors is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Roman expulsion of the Jews from Judea in 135 A.D. scattered the Jewish people throughout the world, in what would become the United States, Europe, and Russia. Late in the nineteenth century the Zionist movement developed among Jews throughout the world, calling for a return to the Middle East and the establishment of an independent Jewish state (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 337).

Prior to World War I, Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire and composed of approximately 90 percent Palestinian Arabs and less than 10 percent Palestinian Jews (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 337). During World War I, Great Britain pledged its support to the Palestinian Arabs' push for self determination and independence in exchange for support in fighting the Turks of the Ottoman Empire. However, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour also promised leaders of the British Zionist movement that Britain would support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (CQ, 1979: 39; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 337). Following World War I, Palestine became a League of Nations Mandate under British rule and small scale Jewish immigration to Palestine began. During this time the first Arab-Jewish conflicts began to erupt in Palestine. The immigration of European Jews continued through the 1930s with the onset of Nazi aggression and Hitler's "final solution." Tension between Palestinian Jews and Arabs increased as Jewish immigration continued throughout World War II and in the years that followed (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 337).



Figure 2.3 U.N. Partition of 1947 (CQ, 1979: 64)

In early 1947, after an Arab-Zionist conference in London failed to resolve the growing conflict in Palestine, the British turned the issue over to the United Nations. In May 1947, the U.N. established an eleven-nation inquiry committee to address the Palestinian issue. The committee ultimately recommended that Palestine be divided into separate Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem and the surrounding area administered by the U.N. as an international trusteeship. On 29 November 1947, the U.S. and the Soviet Union voted with a two-thirds majority in the U.N. General Assembly to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. Figure 2.3 contains a map detailing the U.N. partition plan. Although the Zionists were amenable to partitioning, the plan was totally unacceptable to Palestinian Arabs and full scale civil war erupted in Palestine. During the civil war, Palestinian Jews gained control over most of the area allocated to them by the partition plan. Following the end of the British mandate on 14 May 1948, Palestinian Jews declared their independence and established the state of Israel. The U.S. was the

first country to extend diplomatic recognition to Israel after its declaration of independence.

The Israeli War of Independence (1948-1949). On 15 May 1948, the first Arab-Israeli war began as the armies of Egypt, Transjordan (today known as Jordan), Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon invaded the newly established state of Israel (CQ, 1979: 39, 63-64; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 337). Although numerically superior, conflicting objectives and poor coordination diminished the effectiveness of the attacking Arab forces. On the other hand, a high degree of cohesion and para-military experience gained during the Palestinian civil war characterized Israeli resistance to the attack. By the time of the cease-fire on 7 January 1949, Israel held greater than 30 percent more territory than had been assigned under the U.N. partition plan. Figure 2.4 details Israel's territorial gains as a result of the 1948-1949 war. By July 1949, Israel had signed armistice agreements with all the attacking Arab nations except Iraq, which simply removed its forces from Palestine. Egypt and Jordan took control of the remaining portions of Arab Palestine not occupied by Israel, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan River. Israel gained control of New Jerusalem and Jordan took control of Old Jerusalem (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 96-98; CQ, 1979: 64-65; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 337).

The issue of Palestinian refugees, at the time estimated at more than 700,000, created by Israeli occupation of Arab territory became a recurring topic in future Arab-Israeli negotiations. Perhaps more significant was the Arab nations' refusal to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The Arab states viewed the signing of a peace treaty with the "Zionists" as recognition of Israel's right to exist in Palestine--something they refused to acknowledge. The creation of Palestinian refugees and Arab refusal to enter into peace agreements heightened tensions and left open the possibility of future aggression against Israel. Arab nations refused trade with Israel and prevented Israeli cargo from transiting the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, barring Israel's access to Africa and Asia. Ongoing

Arab and Israeli commando raids increased the level of hostility in the years leading up to 1956 and the second Arab-Israeli war (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 101; CQ, 1979: 65; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 337).

Figure 2.4 Israel After 1948-49 War (CQ, 1979: 64)

The Suez War (1956). One of the major causes of the second Arab-Israeli war was Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956. Britain's withdrawal of 80,000 troops from the canal zone, a new supply of arms from the Soviet Union, and U.S. refusal to help fund the Aswan Dam prompted Nasser to take action. When diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the Suez crisis, Britain and France, the primary shareholders in the Suez Canal Company, secretly enlisted Israel's help in recapturing the canal (CQ, 1979: 65-66; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 339). Israel's fear that the military balance between her and the Arab countries would shift due to

increased Soviet military aid to Egypt and the aggressive posturing of Egyptian President Nasser, prompted Israel to join forces with the British and French (Evron, 1977: 13).

On 26 October 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula and within seven days had driven Egyptian forces from Gaza and the Sinai. In a pre-invasion blitz on 31 October 1956, French and British air forces attacked Egyptian airfields and on 5 November landed troops in Port Said, Egypt. A U.N. cease-fire ended the hostilities on 6 November 1956 and in December 1956, under intense pressure from the U.S. and Soviet Union, Britain and France withdrew their forces from Egypt. In March 1957, following the threat of economic sanctions from the U.S., Israel agreed to remove its forces from the Sinai Peninsula. The United Nations sent a U.N. Emergency Force into the Gaza region and into the southern tip of the Sinai to monitor the borders and ensure Israel's free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel warned that the removal of U.N. troops from the Gulf of Aqaba region would constitute an act of war. Egypt also allowed Israeli shipments to transit the Suez Canal, but ended this conciliatory gesture in 1959 (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 124-131; CQ, 1979: 65-66; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 339).

Although Israel suffered a diplomatic defeat as a result of the Suez War and conceded its territorial gains, Arab hostility continued to increase as the issue of Palestinian refugees merged with the problem of Arab territorial security and sovereignty. Relative calm marked the ten years between 1957 and 1967 as Israeli settlements grew along the Sinai-Gaza frontier and shipments moved freely through the Gulf of Aqaba. This calm was shattered on 18 May 1967 when President Nasser ordered U.N. Emergency Forces from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gulf of Aqaba and moved a large force of Egyptian troops into the Sinai. On 23 May 1967 Nasser declared a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba (CQ, 1979: 66).

The Six-Day War (1967). On 5 June 1967, Israel responded to the blockade and the massing of troops with preemptive air strikes against Egyptian airfields, virtually

destroying Egypt's air force. In the next five days, lightning strikes by Israel would push Egyptian forces back across the Suez, seize control of Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordanian forces, and capture the Golan Heights from Syria along Israel's north-east border. Israel's decisive victory was an overwhelming defeat of its Soviet supplied Arab neighbors. Israel immediately announced it would remain in occupied territory until decisive progress was made towards a permanent peace settlement (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 149-155; CQ, 1979: 66; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 340).



Figure 2.5 Middle East After 1967 War (CQ, 1979: 66)

As a result of the war, Israeli territory grew three times larger than it had been in 1949. The captured territory provided Israel more easily defended borders and provided a buffer from its hostile Arab neighbors. Figure 2.5 contains a map of the Middle East following the 1967 war. However, 1.3 million Palestinians came under Israeli control in Gaza and the West Bank, compounding the "Palestinian question." Amid false allegations

that the U.S. assisted Israel during the war, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Algeria and Yemen severed diplomatic ties with the U.S., bringing Arab-U.S. relations to an all-time low. The Soviet Union and several other Warsaw-Pact nations broke diplomatic relations with Israel (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 153).

Resolution 242. On 22 November 1967 the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 242 which sought to bring about permanent peace in the Middle East. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 is shown in Appendix A. The key points of the resolution called for withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territory; an end to the state of belligerency between the Arab states and Israel; acknowledgment and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence; and establishment of secure and recognizable boundaries (CQ, 1979: 66). The U.N. appointed a mediator to implement the resolution and facilitate dialogue between all parties. However, Israel insisted that recognition through negotiation must come before withdrawal, while the Arabs called on complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory before negotiations would commence (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 155-156; CQ, 1979: 66; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 340-342). Failure to negotiate a permanent settlement and Israeli occupation of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian territory, compounded by the increasing Palestinian refugee problem, eventually lead to the War of Attrition discussed in Chapter V. The Arab-Israeli conflict was marked by varying degrees of superpower involvement from the start. Of particular interest is Soviet involvement in Egypt.

Soviet Involvement in Egypt

Egypt was the first country in the Middle East with which the Soviet Union entered into a military supply relationship. The delivery of Soviet arms to Egypt in September 1955 broke the Middle East arms monopoly held by the Americans, French and British, and represented an assertion of Egypt's independence to other Arab nations. It

was also of immense symbolic value, thrusting Nasser and Egypt to center stage in the Arab world. Moreover, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship appeared to take on a more permanent character when the Soviet Union showed itself willing to supply Egypt with additional and more advanced armaments in the wake of its defeat at the hands of the Israeli, British, and French forces in the 1956 Suez War (Pierre, 1982: 139; Bennett, 1985: 756).

By the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967, the Egyptians had come to depend on the Soviet Union for essentially all their military needs, including the training of Egyptian military personnel in other Warsaw Pact countries and the use of Soviet and East European advisors, instructors and technicians in Egypt. As it had earlier in the aftermath of the Suez War, the Soviet Union stepped in to re-equip and upgrade Egyptian forces following their defeat in the 1967 war. In the process, it introduced a sophisticated network of surface-to-air missiles staffed by Soviet personnel and provided Egypt, just before the outbreak of the 1973 war, with advanced "Scud" surface-to-surface missiles (Bennett, 1985: 756).

During the course of the Yom Kippur war, the Soviet Union resupplied Egypt and Syria with military hardware, an action that the Kremlin had been previously unwilling to consider. As stated earlier, up to the 1973 war, Egypt was the Soviet Union's most important client in the Third World, receiving more Soviet military deliveries than any other country and being the first outside the Warsaw Pact to receive certain advanced weapons (Bennett, 1985: 756).

Despite Egypt's near total dependence upon Soviet military aid by the early 1970s, the Kremlin's influence had been decreasing in recent years. Egyptian political and military leadership had become especially disgruntled with what it perceived to be Soviet attempts to manipulate Egyptian foreign and defense policy through the denial of particular kinds of military hardware. This was unacceptable to leaders in Cairo. The two

nations disagreed on the nature, delivery and use of Soviet arms and tensions were running high between Egyptian officers and Soviet military advisors as a result of personality clashes and disputes over such matters as the way equipment was being used. Finally, there was concern over the "Sovietization" of the military and "satellitization" of Egypt (Pierre, 1982: 165-166; Bennett, 1985: 756).

In 1972, Sadat expelled the majority of the estimated 20,000 Soviet military advisors from Egypt--the first step in a process of redirecting the country westward. The last delivery of major weapons systems, apart from resupply during the Yom Kippur War, arrived in 1974-1975 and included 23 MiG-23 Floggers and 500 T-62 main battle tanks. With the end of Soviet arms deliveries in 1975, Egypt turned to the West for arms, with a strong desire for U.S. military hardware (Russell, 1973: 65; Bennett, 1985: 765).

Summary

Chapter II provided a brief overview of the U.S. security assistance program and presented a discussion of U.S. interests and foreign policy in the Middle East. Next, the chapter outlined a brief history of Egypt. Chapter II concluded with a discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet involvement in Egypt.

III. Methodology

Chapter Overview

This chapter introduces the topic of historical research as the methodology used to document the foundation of U.S. security assistance to Egypt. This chapter then presents a theoretical overview of qualitative research design and analysis. A discussion of reliability and validity follows. Chapter III concludes with the specific methodology used in this study.

Historical Research

Completing a study of U.S. security assistance to Egypt from 1969 through 1979 requires a historical research approach. According to Moseley and Usry, the most difficult task facing the historical analyst is determining what aspects of the subject or issue to emphasize during the study (Moseley and Usry, 1981: 3-7). The nature of history and its diverse interpretations preclude an exhaustive analysis of a general topic. As a result, the researcher tends to concentrate his or her effort on a particular aspect of the topic of interest. Due to the selective nature of this type of study, the researcher omits certain facts that are not germane to the issue of interest. Moseley and Usry maintain that, "It is not a question of whether facts will be ignored; but rather what facts" (Moseley and Usry, 1981: 3). Because the researcher consciously chooses not to examine all the variables associated with an issue or problem, historical research results in assessments rather than conclusions. Moseley and Usry state that, "The primary concern of the historian is not to establish general statements testable by experimentation but to develop explanations about the actions of certain persons and/or certain events" (Moseley and Usry, 1981: 7).

Research Design

Historical research requires an exhaustive search of public records, literature, documents, reports, and other relevant sources that contribute to the investigation at hand (Dane, 1990: 169). Data collection sources fall into two categories: primary and secondary. Primary information serves as the foundation of historical research and is based on original documents, eye witness accounts, and public records. Secondary sources are studies made by others for the purpose of providing historical or contemporary accounts, interpretations or viewpoints. Although it is often difficult to assess the accuracy of secondary sources due to limited knowledge about the research design or the conditions under which the research occurred, the synthesis of primary and secondary sources provides the researcher a greater level of understanding and interpretation (Cooper and Emory, 1995: 240-241). Primary sources of information for this research include annual reports from the Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, records from Congressional hearings on security assistance, and United States Department of State Bulletins. Secondary sources of information include published and unpublished reports, periodicals, professional journals, newspaper articles, and books.

Historical research, such as exploring the evolution of U.S. security assistance to Egypt, is descriptive in nature. Cooper and Emory identify the primary objective of a descriptive study as determining the who, what, when, where, and how of a particular subject (Cooper and Emory, 1995: 116). In most cases, descriptive studies require the use of an *ex post facto* design. In *ex post facto* design, the researcher only reports what happened and is incapable of manipulating or controlling the variables associated with the topic of interest (Cooper and Emory, 1995: 115-116).

Three primary techniques are used in descriptive studies: case studies, content analysis, and archival analysis. In order to maximize the use of multiple sources of information, this study uses a combination of content analysis and archival analysis

(Cooper and Emory, 1995: 115). Content analysis explores the questions and hypotheses surrounding events or conditions by examining books, diaries, speeches, newspapers, and periodicals to gather an impression or feeling about those events or conditions (Jones, 1985: 104). Archival analysis, the other technique used in this study, systematically examines the same questions and hypotheses of interest by searching through official records generated and maintained by society at large. The primary and secondary sources of information outlined in the previous section serve as the sources for content and archival analysis.

Information Analysis

According to Marshall and Rossman, "In qualitative studies, data collection and analysis go hand in hand to promote the emergence of substantive theory grounded in empirical data....The researcher is guided by hypothesis, but shifts or discards them as the data are collected and analyzed" (Marshall and Rossman, 1989: 113). Miles and Huberman outline numerous methods for generating meaning from qualitative sources. Of particular use in descriptive studies are noting patterns and themes, and seeing plausibility (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 245).

Noting Patterns and Themes. When conducting research, recurring patterns, themes, or "gestalts" emerge which tend to pull together the separate pieces of information. These patterns of variables or processes may, according to Miles and Huberman, "jump out" at you and suddenly make sense. The human mind recognizes these patterns so rapidly and easily that it is transparent to the researcher (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 246). Patton states that uncovering patterns and themes "is a creative process that requires making carefully considered judgments about what is really significant and meaningful in the data" (Patton, 1990: 406). The researcher's intelligence, experience, and judgment are instrumental in determining when an observation or pattern

is truly significant (Patton, 1990: 406). The researcher should maintain a certain level of skepticism throughout the pattern finding process. Additionally, the analyst must be sensitive to identifying added evidence of the same pattern and remain open to "disconfirming" or conflicting evidence when it appears (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 246).

Seeing Plausibility. Plausibility, based on intuition, serves as a compass that points the researcher in the direction of conclusions or assessments that appear reasonable and make sense. A "more trustworthy" technique is to be sensitive to *lack of plausibility* (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 247). The key, according to Miles and Huberman, is to "Trust your "plausibility" intuitions, but don't fall in love with them. Subject the preliminary conclusions to other tactics of conclusion drawing and verification" (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 247).

Reliability and Validity. Regardless of the type of study undertaken, an overriding concern is the quality of research design. Validity and reliability are the measures by which research design is gauged. According to Yin, three tests have been summarized in social science textbooks that are applicable to descriptive studies.

> Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied;
> External validity: establishing the domain to which a study's findings can be generalized; and
> Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study--such as the data collection procedures--can be repeated, with the same results. (Yin, 1991: 40-41)

The subjective nature of historical research makes the issues of reliability and validity particularly troublesome. Yin suggests two methods for increasing validity and improving reliability, both of which are relevant when collecting information. The first

method, the use of multiple sources of evidence, addresses the potential problems of validity. According to Yin,

> The use of multiple sources of evidence in case studies allows an investigator to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal, and observational issues. However, the most important advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging lines of inquiry...Thus, any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information, following a corroboratory mode. (Yin, 1991: 97)

In order to increase the reliability of a case study, Yin suggests maintaining a chain of evidence. One should be able to trace the flow of evidence from investigative questions, to final assessment without any gaps in logic. The goal is to examine all aspects of the information throughout the information collection process, eliminating the possibility of lost information due to carelessness or bias. Yin states that maintaining a chain of evidence increases construct validity, as well as reliability (Yin, 1991: 102).

Methodology

The purpose of this study is to develop explanations concerning early development of U.S. security assistance to Egypt and the events shaping that development. The research effort will focus on biographical details of the principal parties, the economics or social factors present from 1969 to 1979, the political forces at work in both the U.S. and the Middle East, or various combinations of these variables. By narrowing the focus of the study to these variables, the researcher will be able to pare the issue down to its essence, screening available information to that which enables the researcher to perform an appropriate analysis and arrive at a meaningful assessment.

In Chapter IV of this thesis, the researcher divides the subject of this study into era profiles based on U.S. presidential administrations and presents the material in a temporal fashion. Era profiles will be constructed of each administration based on the significant political, economic, and strategic issues of the period. Patterns and themes will be

identified in and among these profiles relating to the administration's foreign policy agendas and security assistance. These patterns and themes will be reflected in legislative acts concerning security assistance, changes in national leadership, and global or regional events. Comparison of information from memoirs, magazine articles, historical studies, foreign policy documents, and the dollar amount of security assistance provided Egypt will enable the researcher to note similarities and differences in policies and identify trends. Presentation of era profiles in a temporal fashion will facilitate the construction of a chain of evidence and increase the study's reliability. The question of validity is addressed in this study through the use of multiple sources of information that provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon or event.

Summary

This chapter introduced historical research as the methodology used in this study. The chapter then presented a theoretical overview of qualitative research design and analysis. A discussion of reliability and validity preceded a description of the specific methodology used in this study.

IV. Historical Analysis

Chapter Overview

This chapter provides an historical analysis of the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations' role in laying the foundation for U.S. security assistance to Egypt. Although Egypt received no arms from the U.S. during the Nixon Administration, Nixon's foreign policy towards Egypt and the Middle East set the stage for security assistance to Egypt in future administrations. The Ford Administration's foreign policy in the Middle East was essentially a continuation of Nixon's policies and marked the beginning of actual, non-lethal security assistance to Egypt. Carter's successful mediation of an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement resulted in the largest U.S. arms transfer package to date and set the stage for future large scale security assistance to Egypt.

The Nixon Years (1969-1974)

Richard M. Nixon assumed the office of the President on 20 January 1969 during one of the most tumultuous periods in U.S. history. International and domestic events challenged the new administration at every turn. Riots, arson, bombings, hijackings, and protest demonstrations were becoming a part of the fabric of American life. The Soviet Union's attainment of nuclear parity radically altered the global strategic environment. Dissatisfaction with President Johnson's handling of U.S. involvement in Vietnam was pervasive. The prolonged, expensive (both in lives and dollars) and unsuccessful war in Vietnam had eroded the American people's willingness to assume an activist role in world affairs (Sorley, 1983: 8-9).

Despite the tremendous challenges facing him, Nixon resolved to sustain a meaningful role for America in world affairs. Six initiatives highlighted the broad based foreign policy agenda of the Nixon Administration:

1. Initiating an end to China's isolationism.
2. Improving U.S.-Soviet relations.
3. Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.
4. Seeking a peace settlement in the Middle East.
5. Honorably ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
6. Addressing the challenges of an increasingly global economy. (Sorley, 1983: 11)

Congressional efforts to redefine the tenets of foreign policy administration by raising the issue of who should determine U.S. foreign policy goals hampered Nixon's, and in later years Ford's, foreign policy agenda. This debate manifested itself in both administrations as disputes between the Executive Branch and Congress over the size and direction of U.S. arms transfers (Grimmett, 1985: 65-66). In 1967 Congress imposed severe restrictions on foreign military sales following a fierce debate over foreign aid. In 1968, Congress passed the Foreign Military Sales Act imposing even greater control over arms sales (Sorley, 1983: 5-6).

Vietnam served as the springboard from which many in Congress focused on restricting American involvement overseas and the authority of the President to enter into foreign policy agreements without Congressional approval. North Vietnam prevailed in Southeast Asia despite tremendous levels of economic and military assistance from one of the most powerful countries in the world. More than any other event during this period, the Vietnam conflict drove future allocations of security assistance program resources and reshaped general attitudes towards security assistance (Hildreth, 1985: 23, 26; Sorley, 1983: 15).

The Nixon Doctrine and Security Assistance. The Nixon Doctrine provided a broad conceptual framework for security assistance policy during the Nixon years. President Nixon outlined the tenants of the doctrine during a foreign policy address on 3 November 1969:

> 1. The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
> 2. The United States shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
> 3. In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. (Nixon, 1970: 294)

On 18 February 1970, in the first of a series of annual foreign policy reports to Congress, Nixon expanded on the Nixon Doctrine by outlining as its central thesis:

> that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot--and will not--conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest. (Nixon, 1970: 276)

A "revitalized, expanded, and strengthened" National Security Council, led by Dr. Henry Kissinger, was instrumental in supporting and executing Nixon's international agenda and broad range of policy initiatives (Sorley, 1983: 26).

Early on, the administration identified a viable security assistance program as crucial to deterring aggression abroad and to the success of the Nixon Doctrine. Nixon policymakers presented security assistance as being a less costly way for the U.S. to remain engaged in world affairs and viewed arms transfers as of one of the primary means of maintaining influence abroad without direct U.S. involvement (Grimmett, 1985: 64; Hildreth, 1985: 22). Through security assistance, Nixon sought to build up regional surrogates that could aid in defending American regional interests worldwide--a policy pursued vigorously in the Middle East.

Middle East Policy Objectives. Nixon's arms transfer policy in the Middle East played a key role in seeking a lasting peace in the region. According to Sorley, the objectives of the Nixon arms transfer policy in the Middle East were to "peel Egyptians away from the Soviets, engineer essential military balance in the Arab-Israeli confrontations, negotiate steps toward agreement on a peace settlement, and provide the prospect for the Egyptians of an alternative source of necessary military hardware and supporting devices" (Sorley, 1983: 42). Achievement of these goals would help to reduce the prospect of armed conflict between the Arabs and Israelis, remove the Soviets from the region and safeguard vital Western access to Middle Eastern oil.

The War of Attrition (1969-1970). During August and September of 1967, following the end of the Six Day War in June, Arab leaders held a summit meeting in Khartoum, the Sudan. Arab leaders declared that there would be no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel and that action should be taken to safeguard the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland. As early as 1968, Egyptian President Gamel Nasser, under pressure from other Arab leaders in the region, began to harass the Israeli forces dug in along the Suez Canal. This campaign of harassment against Israeli occupied positions along the Suez Canal during 1969 and 1970 became known as the War of Attrition. Both Egypt and Israel remained on a war footing as the tempo of the operations increased (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 156, 163).

Israel responded quickly and decisively with vicious air raids across the Suez Canal. When these attacks failed to halt Egyptian attacks on Israeli positions along the Suez Canal, Israeli Air Force Phantom jets carried out bombing raids deep into Egypt's interior (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 342). Up to this point, Soviet military aid had been ineffective in helping the Egyptians to halt Israeli air raids. These air raids were becoming increasingly devastating to Nasser, both militarily and politically. On 22 January 1970, Nasser flew to Moscow to meet with Leonid Brezhnev and demanded advanced

Soviet military equipment to use in curtailing Israeli raids into Egypt. Nasser and his military advisors viewed advanced surface-to-air missiles and new Soviet aircraft, initially operated and piloted by Russian crews, as essential to curtailing the unrelenting Israeli attacks of advanced, American supplied aircraft. Nasser overcame initial Soviet reluctance by threatening to resign and turn the presidency over to others in his administration inclined to seek assistance from the West (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 171; Sorley, 1983: 53-54). Eventually, the Soviets delivered and erected over 200 missile batteries along the Suez Canal and provided over 15,000 Soviet military personnel and instructors to Egypt (Sorley, 1983: 54).

In April 1970, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Cisco met with Nasser in Cairo to discuss the deepening Suez crisis. While not denying U.S. commitments to Israel, he conveyed to the Egyptian leader that the U.S. was seeking a "balanced policy" in the Middle East and had great flexibility toward resolving problems in the region (Sorley, 1983: 53-54). On 19 June 1970, concern over the escalating conflict and increasing Soviet involvement prompted U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers to propose an in-place cease-fire and the start of indirect United Nations supervised peace talks between Israel, Egypt and Jordan (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 171; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 342). Distrust of U.S. intentions in the Middle East led Nasser to initially reject the proposal. However, after assurances from Washington of possible future arms deliveries and the acceptability of avoiding any withdrawal prior to a final settlement, Nasser unconditionally accepted the proposal (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 342; Sorley, 1983: 55). Arab reaction to the proposed peace talks was swift. Arab oil producing nations stopped providing subsidies to Egypt, rioting broke out in the more radical Arab countries, and the specter of civil war emerged in Jordan (Sorley, 1983: 55).

Following Israeli concurrence of the terms of the proposal, and just hours before the arranged cease-fire, Egyptian and Soviet personnel moved twelve additional missile

batteries into the canal zone in violation of the cease-fire agreement. Israel walked away from the talks as a result of the cease-fire violations and negotiations stalled (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 171; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 342; Sorley, 1983: 55). Talks did not resume until after the death of Gamel Nasser on 28 September 1970 and the accession of vice-president Anwar Sadat to the Egyptian presidency.

Superpower Diplomacy. Following the funeral of Nasser, the U.S. established private contacts with the new Egyptian leader. Sadat's relative diplomatic flexibility, as opposed to Nasser's, prompted further public and private dialogue between the U.S. and Egypt (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 175; Sorley, 1983: 58). In May 1971, Sadat removed from office several high-ranking Egyptian government officials who had been working closely with the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter, Soviet President Podgorny visited Cairo and personally pressed Sadat to sign a fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Sadat signed the treaty on 27 May 1971 to allay Soviet fears concerning his intentions with the West and to guarantee Egypt the military equipment it needed to maintain a balance of power with the U.S. supplied Israel (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 175; Sorley, 1983: 56-57; Thornton, 1989: 205).

As early as December 1970 and continuing through early 1971, U.N. special representative Gunnar Jarring worked to revive the dormant Israeli-Egyptian talks. Jarring suggested that Israel promise a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories in the context of reciprocal security pledges. Shortly thereafter, Anwar Sadat declared his willingness to sign a peace agreement with Israel if U.N. Resolution 242 were fully implemented. One key point of Resolution 242 called for the withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 171; Hartzmann and Wendzel; 1985: 342). The Israelis balked at Sadat's proposal, stating that secure and recognized boundaries were items to be negotiated, not unilaterally determined in advance. Israel claimed the Egyptian interpretation of Resolution 242 "would have Israel restore its past

territorial vulnerability," which Israel would never allow (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 342-343). Efforts on the part of the United Nations, United States, and the Soviet Union to negotiate a satisfactory settlement between Egypt and Israel came to a standstill.

More concerned with Egyptian nationalism than Pan-Arab nationalism (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 172; Russell, 1993: 65), Anwar Sadat was becoming increasingly frustrated with the pace of diplomatic negotiations and the unacceptable timing, quantity and quality of arms deliveries from Moscow. In March 1971, Anwar Sadat made the first of four trips to Moscow to address Egyptian concerns. During his first secret meeting with Soviet leaders in Moscow he outlined the need for a joint strategy for dealing with Israel, an equal arms footing in the region, and improvements in the flow of arms deliveries. The meeting ended without satisfactory progress on any of the three issues. Similar meetings in October 1971 and February and April 1972 resulted in vague promises and did little to allay growing distrust between the new Egyptian leader and the Kremlin (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 174-175; Sorley, 1983: 59).

In May 1971, Secretary of State Rogers met with Sadat and proposed the idea of "withdrawal for guarantees" (Sorley, 1983: 59). Sadat desired direct involvement on the part of the U.S. to exert pressure on Israel to force a diplomatic Egyptian-Israeli settlement. Egypt also needed Soviet military supplies should diplomatic efforts fail and a military option became necessary. However, primarily due to the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, dialogue between the U.S. and Egypt all but stopped (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 175). On 17 July 1972, after the United States-Soviet summit in Moscow failed to generate a diplomatic resolution for the Arab-Israeli situation and further negotiations with Moscow concerning arms deliveries proved unproductive, Sadat ordered Soviet personnel to leave Egypt (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 175; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 343; Sorley, 1983: 61). Years of catering to the Soviet Union in order to procure vitally needed military hardware had severely undermined Egyptian prestige among Arab nations

in the Middle East. Sadat's expulsion of the Soviets culminated many years of dissatisfaction with Soviet involvement in Egypt.

Shortly after the dismissal, Sadat began diplomatic initiatives targeted at the U.S. Through a number of messages sent through intelligence channels, Nixon acknowledged that expulsion was an important step in normalizing relations and pledged to fully address the issues in the Middle East following the presidential elections and completion of Vietnam peace negotiations. However, the approval of 48 Phantom and 36 Skyhawk aircraft for delivery to Israel stymied the burgeoning U.S.-Egyptian dialogue (Sorley, 1983: 59). Additional pressures from within the Middle East served to unravel hopes of a peaceful resolution to Egyptian-Israeli tensions. Sadat's standing with the Egyptian public, Egyptian military, and other Arab nations increased with the dismissal of the Soviets. At the same time, hard-line Arab nations providing renewed subsidies to Egypt were pushing for a campaign to regain Arab territory occupied by the Israelis during the 1967 Six-Day-War (Sorley, 1983: 62).

Late in 1972, Sadat approached Syria and began exploring the feasibility of a limited war against Israel to regain Arab occupied territory and force international attention on the problems in the Middle East. To Sadat, the timing of the campaign was right. First, Egypt was approaching the peak of military readiness, receiving significant military arms from the Soviet Union. Under pressure from hard-liners in his own government, Secretary Brezhnev authorized renewal of arms deliveries to Egypt, including advanced equipment requested by Sadat. Interpreted by some as a Soviet conciliatory offer in response to their expulsion from Egypt earlier in the year, deliveries of tanks, aircraft, bridging equipment, and electronic equipment continued on an unprecedented scale from December 1972 through June 1973 (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 177; Evron, 1977: 6; Sorley, 1983: 63). Second, economic need precipitated action as the oil producing Arab nations, which had been providing economic subsidies to Egypt, expected

some movement against the Israelis. Next, with the advent of détente between the U.S. and Soviet Union, the possibility of an imposed solution for the region became a real possibility. One final factor contributed to Sadat's decision to attack Israel--the use of oil as a strategic weapon.

The U.S. and Israel did not expect the Arab countries to take military action for a number of reasons. U.S. and Israeli policymakers believed that the expulsion of Soviet advisors, coupled with Washington's massive aid to the Israelis, negated any military option on the part of Egypt. U.S. and Israeli strategists maintained that the military balance of power in the region precluded an Arab victory and that the Arabs would not begin a war they knew they could not win. Three previous wars, clearly establishing Israeli superiority on the battlefield, reinforced this line of thinking (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 177; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 343). This belief persisted even after the onset of renewed arms deliveries by the Soviet Union.

As late as May 1973, the Nixon Administration believed that diplomacy was the rational course of action in the Middle East. In Nixon's fourth annual foreign policy report to Congress, published on 3 May 1973, he included a direct overture to those in the Middle East:

> ...the United States considers it a principal objective to rebuild its political relations with those Arab states with whom we enjoyed good relations for most of the post-war period but which broke relations with us in 1967....The United States is prepared for normal bilateral relations with all the nations in the Middle East. (Nixon, 1973: 139)

Additionally, Nixon and Kissinger did not believe Moscow would be willing to jeopardize détente by encouraging rash action on the part of Egypt and Syria. During the second U.S.-Soviet summit meeting held in June 1973, the Soviets had agreed not to take unilateral advantage of the situation in the Middle East (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 343). However on 6 October 1973, defying diplomacy and logic, Egypt and Syria

launched a preemptive attack on Israel (Hartzmann and Wendzel 1985: 343; Sorley, 1983: 84-85). Nixon later commented about the onset of the war in his memoirs:

> We had a particularly delicate situation insofar as the Egyptians were concerned. Beginning in February 1973, with a view toward building better relations, we had had a series of private contacts with them. While we had to keep the interests of the Israelis uppermost during this conflict in which they were the victims of aggression, I hoped that we could support [the Israelis] in such a way that we would not force an irreparable break with the Egyptians, the Syrians, and the other Arab nations. (Nixon, 1978: 921-922)

The Yom Kippur War (October 1973). The fourth Arab-Israeli conflict, often referred to as the Yom Kippur War because it started on the Jewish Day of Atonement, began on the morning of 6 October 1973. In a preemptive, coordinated attack, Egyptian and Syrian forces broke through weakly defended Israeli forward fortifications and advanced into Israeli occupied territory. While Syrian tanks attacked along the Golan Heights, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and, under an umbrella of Soviet supplied surface-to-air missiles, quickly advanced five miles into the Sinai Peninsula (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 177; CQ, 1979: 67; Sorley, 1983: 68).

The element of surprise, unprecedented coordination on the part of Arab forces, and the employment of sophisticated new Soviet weapons enabled Arab forces to inflict heavy losses on Israel and make rapid gains on the battlefield in the early part of the war (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 177-178; CQ, 1979: 67). Forcing Israel to fight a "set battle" allowed Arab forces to capitalize on the courage and training of their soldiers and the numerical superiority of their manpower and equipment. Initially, this "set battle" negated Israel's tactic of "rapid movement and envelopment," used so effectively in previous Arab-Israeli wars. Extremely costly in men and equipment to both sides, the protracted battle led at first to Soviet resupply of Arab forces and then to U.S. airlifting of supplies to Israel (Safran, 1974: 216-217). By 17 October 1973, the U.S. and Soviet

Union were airlifting between 700 and 800 tons of military equipment into the Middle East daily (Mideast, 1973: 15).

With the resupply of vitally needed equipment flowing at unprecedented levels, averaging 50 tons per hour at its peak, the tide of the battle began to turn in Israel's favor (Kissinger, 1982: 525). By 22 October 1973, the date of the first U.S.-Soviet proposed cease-fire called for by U.N. Resolution 338, Israeli forces had retaken the Golan Heights and advanced within 40 kilometers of Damascus, Syria. On the western front, Israel had recrossed the Suez, encircled the Egyptian Third Army, and controlled the approaches to Cairo (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 178; CQ, 1979: 67). Scheduled to go into effect within twelve hours of its adoption, the cease-fire disintegrated amid violations by both sides. A second cease-fire went into effect on 24 October 1973. Later the same day, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States that the two nations join together and send troops into the region to supervise the truce. The United States rejected the proposal, which supported the creation of a U.N. observer force without superpower participation. Nixon placed U.S. armed forces on worldwide alert early in the morning of 25 October 1973 in response to Soviet threats, amid allegations of Israeli cease-fire violations, to unilaterally move troops into the Middle East to supervise the truce. In a message to Sadat the night of 24 October 1973, Nixon stated:

> I ask you to consider the impossibility for us for undertaking the diplomatic initiative which was to start with Dr. Kissinger's visit to Cairo on November 7 if the forces of one of the great nuclear powers were to be involved militarily on Egyptian soil.
> We are at the beginning of a new period in the Middle East. Let us not destroy it at this moment. (Nixon, 1978: 939)

Early on the morning of 25 October 1973, Nixon sent a letter to the Soviet Embassy for transmission to Secretary Brezhnev urging restraint and emphasizing that the U.S. viewed "unilateral action as a matter of the gravest concern involving incalculable consequences" (Nixon, 1978: 939). The growing crisis was averted later that day when

Moscow agreed to a U.N. Security Council resolution establishing an international peace-keeping force without superpower participation (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 180; CQ, 1979: 68; Hartzmann and Wendzel. 1985: 255). Appendix B contains the key points of U.N. Security Council Resolution which called for an end to hostilities in the Yom Kippur War.

The first face-to-face encounter between Israeli and Egyptian negotiators occurred on 11 November 1973 when Israeli Major General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Major General Mohammed Abdel Ghany el-Gamasy signed a six-point cease-fire agreement drafted by U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger. The agreement, signed at a United Nations tent at kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, resulted in an exchange of prisoners and the end of the Israeli siege of the city of Suez and the Egyptian Third Army (Bickerton and Klausner; 1991: 190; CQ, 1979: 68).

The Yom Kippur War served as a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and ultimately Egyptian-Israeli relations. Although Israel had turned the tide of the battle at the end, it was not without great cost in lives and equipment. Furthermore, it came at the expense of increasing dependence on the U.S. for military and economic aid (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 178-179; CQ, 1979: 68). A fact that would manifest itself in future Egyptian-Israeli disengagement negotiations and peace talks. For Sadat, his goal of refocusing world attention on the issues of the Middle East was accomplished.

Additionally, because Egyptian military proficiency had so far surpassed previous efforts and exceeded Israeli and American expectations, Sadat enhanced his bargaining position and the destroyed "myth of Israeli invincibility" (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 179; CQ, 1979: 68; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 343). However, the most far reaching outcome of the Yom Kippur War was the related oil embargo against the U.S. This reinforced policy concerns about maintaining access to the oil resources of the Middle

East region while achieving a lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors (Hildreth, 1985: 29).

The Arab oil embargo proved to be one of the most significant outcomes of the Yom Kippur War. On October 17, three days after the U.S. began resupplying arms to Israel, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) imposed a total embargo on oil exports to the U.S. OAPEC also placed oil embargoes of varying degrees on other countries, depending on the extent of their economic and political support for Israel. A fourfold increase in the posted price of oil two months later by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) exacerbated the global economic impact of the embargo (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 180; CQ, 1979: 70-71). In 1960, a group of South American, Asian, and Middle Eastern oil exporting countries established OPEC to maintain oil prices at high levels by setting production quotas based on world market demands. In 1968, a group of Arab nations formed another cartel called OAPEC to address the particular interests of the Arab world. While Arab nations enjoyed membership in both cartels, OAPEC membership was limited to Arab oil producing and exporting countries (CQ, 1979: 79).

The economic and political impact of the oil embargo on America's European allies and Japan, and their resulting change in attitude at the U.N. towards Israel and the crisis in the Middle East, was more favorable than the Arabs had anticipated. As the countries of the world softened their position towards the Arab position, the flow of oil resumed, albeit at higher prices. The embargo against the U.S. did not end until after Kissinger's strenuous mediation of a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1974 and the resumption of U.S. diplomatic relations with Egypt (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 180-181; Sorley, 1983: 65-66). Nevertheless, the oil embargo of 1973 disrupted the global economy, pushed the U.S. into the worst recession since the depression, and highlighted the dependence of the global community on Middle East oil.

Ultimately, the increased revenues generated by higher oil prices enabled oil producing Arab nations to be more selective in seeking arms and military assistance, thus decreasing their dependence on the U.S. and Soviet Union (Becker, 1982: 419; Sorley, 1983: 66).

Shuttle Diplomacy. Nixon and Kissinger agreed that it was imperative that the U.S. play an active role in seeking an Arab-Israeli settlement. However, domestic upheaval at home, in particular Watergate, would preempt Nixon's active participation in the settlement process. As a result, Kissinger assumed the dominant role in seeking an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement. Kissinger's step-by-step approach to negotiations, used effectively in China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, became the Nixon Administration's diplomatic tool of choice in the Middle East. (Quandt, 1993: 183, 187). From the onset of hostilities, U.S. actions had been driven by two objectives: get the fighting stopped as soon as possible, and get it stopped on terms that would be most conducive to a more permanent settlement in the region. Once the cease-fire went into effect and with the beginning of the first Arab-Israeli peace conference in Geneva on 21 December 1973, Kissinger turned to the second objective (Sorley, 1983: 65).

The participants at Geneva were Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the U.S., the Soviet Union and the United Nations. Syria boycotted the initial meeting. The first round of the peace conference collapsed after the first day, but not before the participants reached an agreement to begin talks on separating Egyptian and Israeli forces along the Suez Canal. The breakdown of the talks in Geneva presented the opportunity for indirect, step-by-step negotiations, between the parties involved. Bypassing direct U.N. and Soviet involvement minimized the possibility of negotiations becoming mired in superpower brinkmanship (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 191).

As a result of Kissinger's step-by-step negotiations, also known as shuttle diplomacy, Egypt and Israel signed a disengagement agreement on 18 January 1974. The agreement called for an Israeli withdrawal ten to twenty kilometers into the Sinai, the

establishment of a U.N. buffer zone, and the resumption of non-military Israeli shipments, in non-Israeli flagged vessels, through the Suez Canal (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 191; CQ, 1979: 68). During an earlier meeting between Sadat and Kissinger in December 1973, the U.S. established limited diplomatic relations with Egypt and Sadat promised to help get the Arab oil embargo lifted. Egypt and the U.S. resumed full diplomatic relations in late February 1974 and by March 1974 Middle Eastern oil was flowing to the U.S. (Sorley, 1983: 69).

The Geneva conference was instrumental in obtaining Soviet cooperation in seeking a cessation of hostilities. However, conflicting interests on the part of Israel, Egypt, and the U.S. complicated negotiations. Israel remained intent on removing Egypt from "Arab encirclement," while Egypt and the U.S. sought to use peace talks as a means to finalize Egypt's shift into the Western camp (Thornton, 1989: 254). Although Egypt and Israel agreed that the disengagement accord of 18 January 1974 was only a "step toward a final, just and durable peace," neither side appeared willing to make the compromises necessary to reach a final accord (Thornton, 1989: 254-255). A change in Israeli leadership, brought about by elections in December 1973 and the resignation of Golda Meir in April 1974, followed by a change in U.S. administration brought about by Nixon's resignation following Watergate, stalled further negotiations (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 192).

The Ford Years (1974-1976)

With the resignation of President Nixon on 9 August 1974, Gerald Ford became the 38th President of the United States. Shortly after taking office, in a clear reaffirmation of the Nixon Doctrine, Ford stated that his basic approach to security assistance would be to provide material support to friends and allies willing and able to carry out the burden of their own self defense (Grimmett, 1985: 73).

Renewed Diplomacy. In March 1975, Kissinger renewed his efforts at seeking further disengagement accords in the Sinai Peninsula. After 15 days of shuttling between Egypt and Israel he declared on March 23 that his efforts had failed and returned to the United States. Israel refused to pull back from the Sinai, insisting on keeping oil fields captured during the war, occupying strategic passes in the area, and maintaining the post-1967 civilian settlements in the Sinai. These conditions were unacceptable to Egyptian leaders. Prior to returning, Kissinger informed Ford of the breakdown in negotiations and the U.S. announced a reassessment of its policy in the Middle East. In a 21 March 1975 message to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin intended to pressure Israel to accept a compromise package, Ford stated:

> I wish to express my profound disappointment over Israel's attitude....Kissinger's mission, encouraged by your government, expresses vital United States' interests in the region. Failure of which will have a far-reaching inpact on the region and on our relations. I have given instructions for a reassessment of United States' policy in the region, including our relations with Israel....You will be notified of our decision. (Rabin, 1979: 256)

Israel failed to relent in its position, in part due to its faith in lobbyists on Capitol Hill, and the negotiations remained at an impasse (Ford, 1979: 287-288).

On 2 June 1975, Ford met with Sadat in Salzburg, Austria, to discuss the status of negotiations. In a series of meetings, Ford conveyed his frustration at the pace of the talks and the fear that the continued impasse would result in another war. Sadat agreed and suggested a proposal that would be acceptable to Egypt. Sadat suggested a buffer zone around the strategic passes in which the U.S. would keep a limited number of non-military personnel to monitor the region and warn either side of an impending attack (Ford, 1979: 290-291). Later, when the topic turned to Egypt's need for military and economic assistance, Ford stated that because of the U.S.-Israeli relationship the U.S. could not supply Egypt with offensive weapons. "We might, however," he continued, "be able to provide some C-130 transport planes" (Ford, 1979: 291).

The proposed reassessment of the U.S. relationship with Israel, coupled with Sadat's plan (proposed to Rabin as conceived by the U.S.) brought Israel back to the negotiating table (Ford, 1979: 291; Hartzmann and Wendzal, 1985: 345). In August 1975, Kissinger returned to the Middle East to continue his diplomatic efforts and on 4 September 1975 Egypt and Israel signed the final disengagement agreement. Israel agreed to relinquish the oil fields and agreed to the stationing of 200 U.S. technicians to provide regional surveillance, signaling U.S. commitment to both countries. Appendix C contains highlights of the 4 September 1975 disengagement accord. Furthermore, the U.S. had promised significant levels of economic assistance to both countries (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 192; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 345). During testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee in July 1974, Secretary Kissinger supported the administration's $250 million in proposed economic assistance for Egypt by stating that the aid was tied to Egypt's move from confrontation to negotiation in resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute and to the Egyptian leaders' growing friendship and trust (Sorley, 1983: 72).

The signing of the second disengagement accord averted the possibility of renewed hostilities. Sidestepping Soviet interference, U.S. diplomacy produced a comprehensive, lasting agreement between Egypt and Israel. Egypt recovered occupied territory and oil fields and showed that it was willing to embrace peace as it moved towards renewed relations with the West. Sadat's initiative laid the foundation for increased economic prosperity and assistance for Egypt. The Israelis, though unhappy at relinquishing the strategic passes and the oil fields, received unprecedented promises of aid and guarantees of oil supplies. Furthermore, Washington's active involvement and U.S. personnel stationed in the region made attacks from either side less likely. (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 192-195; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 345). With the signing of the agreement, the immediate need for further step-by-step negotiations was finished. For the remainder

of the Ford Administration, attempts at brokering further Arab-Israeli peace were not a priority.

An End and a New Beginning. The Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi and War Minister Gamassy met with Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow in December 1974 to discuss replacement of arms destroyed during the war and the need for newer weapons systems. Shortly after the meeting, Sadat announced the cancellation of Brezhnev's planned January 1975 visit and the Soviet's refusal to supply the arms requested by Egypt. He stated that none of the advanced weapons requested had been delivered and that only a limited number of spare parts had been received. Apart from the purchase of thirty MiG-21 engines from China, Egypt's attempts to obtain replacement parts for their Soviet-built equipment had been unsuccessful due to licensing agreements imposed on the recipients of Soviet arms that prevented such sales (Sorley, 1983: 71). On 15 March 1976, Sadat proclaimed "I fall on my knees only before God" and unilaterally abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union he had signed in 1971 (Whetten, 1977: 34, 36-37). Following the rejection of the treaty, top level Egyptian delegations began widespread efforts at procuring arms from Western suppliers, in particular France, Germany, Great Britain, and the U.S. (Egypt Begins Search, 1976: 21).

Sadat's rejection of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty signaled the end of Soviet military aid and the beginning of U.S. security assistance to Egypt. As early as 1975, the U.S. Congress realized that Sadat would soon be turning to the U.S. for some type of military assistance. In a Report of the Special Subcommittee on the Middle East, dated 11 March 1975, committee members stated that, "It is the belief of the subcommittee that at some time in the near future the Egyptians may ask to buy military equipment from the United States to test American evenhandedness in dealing with both sides in the Middle East dispute" (CAS, 1975: 5). Later, during an October 1975 visit to Washington, U.S. State Department officials informed Sadat that the U.S. was prepared to offer "certain military

assistance" to Egypt (Marder, 1976: A:3). This overture reinforced President Ford's statements during an interview one day prior to Sadat's visit that he believed the U.S. had an "implied commitment" to make certain equipment available to Egypt (Gwertzman, 1976: 1:1). In May 1976, following up on the 1975 sale of trucks, jeeps, and an aircraft reconnaissance camera system, and his earlier promise to Sadat, Ford approved the sale of six C-130 transport aircraft to Egypt. Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco indicated that the sale was a "gesture of U.S. support for Sadat's policies of moderation. As such, we hope it will encourage Sadat to continue on the peaceful path he has chosen" (CFA, 1976: 31). The Ford Administration had continued the progress towards Middle East peace and normalization of relations with Egypt started during the Nixon Administration. The success of U.S. efforts at brokering a permanent Egyptian-Israeli peace would be realized under Carter Administration and ultimately lead to long term U.S. security assistance to Egypt.

The Carter Years (1977-1979)

Foreign Policy and Arms Restraint. President Jimmy Carter entered office with deep concerns about the rise in world arms sales and the fact that the U.S. led all other exporting countries in arms sales. Carter was also greatly concerned about human rights violations, particularly in those countries that received security assistance from the U.S. (Benson, 1979: 3-4; Lebovic, 1988: 116; Lewandowski, 1986: 76; Pell, 1986: 33-34). Soon after his election, Carter ordered a suspension of arms transfers pending a review of U.S. military sales practices (Benson, 1979: 6; Policy Decision Near, 1977: 20). Three months later, on 13 May 1977, Carter formalized his administration's restrictive arms transfer policy by signing Presidential Directive 13. Announcing his arms transfer policy in a presidential address at the University of Notre Dame, Carter stated that the "United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy

implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security" (CFR, 1977: 1). The policy statement went on to outline six controls that established quantitative and qualitative criteria for future arms sales. These controls served to:

- Reduce new commitments under the foreign military sales and military assistance program for weapons and weapons related items, in terms of the dollar volume over previous years by 8 percent in FY 1977 (CFR, 1977: 1).

- Restrain the U.S. from being the first supplier to introduce newly produced, advanced weapons systems into a region thereby creating a substantial new capability and threatening the regional balance. Furthermore, the sales or coproduction of such weaponry would be prohibited until it was operationally deployed with the U.S. forces (CFR, 1977: 1-2).

- Prohibit development or significant modifications of advanced systems for export (CFR, 1977: 2).

- Prohibit, with minor exceptions, coproduction agreements for significant weapons, equipment, and major components (CFR, 1977: 2).

- Stipulate that the U.S., as a condition for sale of certain weapons, equipment or major components, would not entertain requests for retransfers of that equipment to third countries (CFR, 1977: 2).

- Suggest amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulation requiring policy level authorization by the Department of State for actions by agents of the U.S. or private manufacturers that might promote arms sales abroad. Additionally, embassy and military representatives abroad were restricted from promoting sales (CFR, 1977: 2).

Sales to U.S. allies, NATO countries, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, were exempt from these controls. The policy statement also excluded Israel, reaffirming U.S. commitment to its security (CFR, 1977: 1). This policy placed the burden of proof for

need on the recipient and human rights became the primary criterion in evaluating initial or continued arms sales (Lewandowski, 1986: 76; Pell, 1986: 34). The administration recognized that the key to the success of its new direction in arms sales was support and cooperation from other countries exporting arms (Benson, 1979: 7; Lebovic, 1988: 116; Lewandowski, 1986: 76). Three objectives were at the heart of Carter's arms restraint policy. First, it sought to limit the volume of arms transfers worldwide. Second, the policy intended to rationalize the process by which arms transfer decisions were made by placing quantitative and qualitative controls on arms transfers and placing the burden of justification on those who supported transfers rather than opposed them. Finally, the policy was intended to curtail transfers that exceeded legitimate defense needs, promoted regional arms races or otherwise did not advance U.S. interests (CQ; 1980: 89; Salomon and others, 1981: 200-201).

The dynamics of global change and Soviet posturing in the latter part of the seventies made application of the new arms policy difficult at best. On 7 July 1977, shortly after the inception of his new arms policy, Carter proposed the $1.2 billion sale of seven airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft to Iran (Final Carter Export, 1977: 14). The controversial sale met with fierce opposition, forcing Carter to withdraw the proposal. However, after a renewed request on 7 September 1977 Congress allowed the sale to proceed. The order was canceled when the new Islamic revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini canceled $7 billion in arms purchases from the U.S. (CQ, 1981: 50). The approval of other similar controversial sales, such as the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, tended to overshadow the administration's efforts at restraint (CQ; 1980: 89; Pell, 1986: 34; Report Criticizes Carter, 1978; 54). These exceptions, and others like them, led to heated battles in Congress and criticisms of Carter's arms transfer policy (CQ, 1981: 50; Klare, 1991: 22-23). Additionally, the programmed 8 percent annual reduction in arms transfers started in FY 1977, and continued in FY 1978 and FY 1979, were

eliminated in 1980 after Carter failed to gain an international consensus for arms restraint (CQ, 1980: 90).

Towards Peace. When Carter took office in 1977, the overriding Middle East objectives of his administration were regional stability, resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and an end to Soviet influence (Carter, 1982: 274-274). Although he did not initially have a coordinated Middle East policy in mind, by the summer of 1977 he believed that shuttle diplomacy had accomplished all it could and that it was time to reconvene the Geneva Conference and negotiate a comprehensive settlement. However, Israeli resistance to participation by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) precluded any immediate chance of a meeting. On 1 October 1977, both the U.S. and Soviet Union jointly proposed to all parties a new set of principles for reconvening the talks and negotiating a settlement. Israel continued to balk at the issue of Palestinian participation and Egypt was furious with U.S. attempts to increase the Soviet Union's role in the Middle East settlement (Bickerton and Klausner, 1983: 200; Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 346).

With movement towards settlement at a standstill and the prospect of greater Soviet influence in the region, Sadat proclaimed to the Egyptian National Assembly his willingness to go to the Israeli parliament if necessary to secure peace. Perhaps one of the boldest diplomatic moves in history, this proposal shook the foundation of Arab solidarity. On 19 November 1977, following a personal invitation by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Israel to address the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. During his historic address Sadat stated, "I declare to the whole world that we accept to live with you in permanent peace based on justice" (Sadat, 1984: 596). Sadat went on to outline the conditions for a permanent peace: Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war and recognition of the Palestinian right to create an independent state (Sadat, 1984: 598). Reactions were mixed in the Arab

world. The more moderate states took a wait and see attitude, while the more radical factions--Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, and the PLO--denounced Sadat's gesture. The Soviets were also highly critical of the move (Hartzmann and Wendzel, 1985: 347). Negotiations between Egypt and Israel began almost immediately following the 19 November 1977 address at the Knesset. With the U.S. serving as a sounding board for both parties, negotiations continued with proposal and counter-proposal (Bickerton and Klausner, 1983: 201-202).

1978 Plane Package. On 14 February 1978, in an effort to placate U.S. allies in the Middle East and keep the peace talks moving, Carter proposed a $4.8 billion aircraft sale for the region. The "aircraft package" called for the sale of a variety of aircraft to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and for the first time, Egypt. The package submitted to Congress for approval called for the sale of 50 F-5E aircraft to Egypt at a cost of $400 million. Although ultimately approved, the sale of the older, less sophisticated F-5E still stirred debate in Congress (CQ, 1981: 51; Packaging of Fighter Sale, 1978: 17; Pierre, 1978: 154). In defending the proposed sale of the aircraft to Egypt, Carter argued that, "It is my considered judgment that the aircraft sales to Egypt are essential to enable President Sadat to continue his efforts for peace" (Carter, 1978: 897). The sale to Egypt marked the first U.S. transfer of offensive weapons to Egypt in twenty years (CQ, 1981: 52).

Carter's arms transfer policies in the Middle East, as illustrated by the plane package deal, were central to the process of negotiating peace in the region and an indication of the "increasing linkage" between arms sales and the negotiating process (Pierre, 1978: 148). The sale signaled a new era in relative even-handedness for U.S. arms transfers in the region and lent credence to Sadat's somewhat risky, in the eyes of many of his political and military supporters, reliance upon the U.S. for future military aid (Packaging of Fighter Sale, 1978: 17; Pierre, 1978: 149, 154-155).

Camp David. Despite U.S. efforts, by August 1978 the Egyptian-Israeli talks were at a standstill. Fearing a complete breakdown of negotiations, Carter offered to personally mediate further negotiations. Both Begin and Sadat agreed and all parties met with Carter at the presidential retreat in Camp David, Maryland, on 5 September 1978. On 17 September 1978, after thirteen days of meetings, of which Carter was to call "some of the most unpleasant experiences of my life," two procedural accords were signed by Sadat and Begin, and witnessed by Carter (Carter, 1982: 402). The first, a "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," called for negotiations among Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Palestinian representatives to settle the question of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A self-governing Arab authority would be set up to replace the Israeli military forces for five years while negotiations were taking place concerning "the final status of the West Bank and Gaza" (Quandt, 1986: 376-381). The second accord, a "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel," was a draft proposal for a peace agreement to be negotiated and signed within three months. The peace treaty called for a three year, phased Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and return of the territory to Egypt, as well as allow Israeli ships to pass through the Suez Canal (Quandt, 1986: 381-383). Both parties agreed to U.N. oversight of the provisions of the accords.

1979 Peace Treaty Aid. Along with the accords signed at the White House treaty ceremony on 17 September 1978, were memoranda of agreement between the U.S. and Israel and the U.S. and Egypt. Letters from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Egyptian and Israel defense ministers promised both countries unprecedented levels of security assistance. The letter to Israel promised $3 billion, of which $800 million would be in the form of grants, to help construct new airfields to replace those in the Sinai Peninsula lost due to the treaty. Brown also informed Israel that the U.S. was prepared to take positive action on a number of previously submitted weapons requests. A similar letter to the Egyptian minister of defense promised $1.5 billion in military aid in the next

three years. The letter included a list of military equipment Egypt would be allowed to purchase (Quandt, 1993: 323).

The signing of the formal Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty at a White House ceremony on 26 March 1979 signaled the beginning of the U.S. role of "protector and benefactor" to both nations as Egypt and Israel became the recipients of the largest American security assistance package since the program's beginning in 1947 (Bickerton and Klausner, 1983: 204; CQ, 1981: 52). Despite it representing an unprecedented level of economic, military and political aid to the Middle East, the package generated little controversy as it passed both houses of Congress after the treaty was signed. The long term loans associated with the package represented a significant shift in U.S. aid to Israel and represented the first U.S. loans offered to Egypt for weapons purchases (CQ, 1981: 52).

The nature of the commitments to Egypt was substantial. Terms of the loans were the existing market rates, a ten-year deferment on payment of the principal, and twenty years to repay the loan (CQ, 1981: 52). The terms of the assistance enabled Egypt to purchase 34 F-4E fighter aircraft, 70 Sparrow and 500 Maverick missiles, 700 armored personnel carriers, 12 Hawk air-defense systems and other military equipment (CFAb, 1979: 1). In a prepared statement before Congress supporting the post-treaty aid packages for Egypt and Israel, the director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, Department of Defense, stated:

> with the break in Egyptian-Soviet relations, Egypt no longer has a reliable source of supply....In enacting a single peace package, the Congress would demonstrate that the United States is fully committed to the peace process. To fail to appropriate the full sum would raise serious doubts about whether the United States stands behind the courageous action taken by Egypt and Israel in concluding the peace treaty. (CFAa, 1979: 9)

Despite being a one-time arrangement relating to the peace treaty, the $4.5 billion package signaled the continuance of U.S. aid to Israel and the beginning of future economic and military aid to Egypt through future foreign aid programs.

Summary

This chapter provided an historical analysis of the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administration's role in laying the foundation for U.S. security assistance to Egypt. The ten year period from 1969 to 1979 marked a dramatic turning point in U.S.-Egyptian relations. During this period, the foreign policy initiatives of three presidential administrations facilitated Egypt's shift from the Soviet sphere of influence to that of the West. Nixon entered the Oval Office in one of the most turbulent periods in American history. The Nixon Administration's attempts at peacemaker in the region prior to and after the Yom Kippur War, and as supplier of reliable, state of the art weapons to Israel during the war, set the stage for the Soviet Union's departure from Egypt and laid the foundation for an end to Egyptian-Israeli hostilities. During the Ford Administration, arms transfers, and the promise of future transfers, served as an incentive to Egypt to continue on the road to peace with Israel. President Carter's ideological attempts at arms restraint met with significant difficulty in the Middle East. His personal intervention in mediating a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and his administration's promise of the largest security assistance package to date brought an end to over thirty years of Egyptian-Israeli hostilities. It also served as the beginning of the U.S. becoming Egypt's primary supplier of military assistance for the next decade and a half.

V. Conclusion

Chapter Overview

Chapter I introduced the purpose of this research as identifying the role U.S. foreign policy played in shaping Egypt's transition from Soviet military assistance to U.S. security assistance from 1969 through 1979 and the factors shaping that transition. The chapter also outlined three investigative questions that served as the framework for completing this study. Prior to the historical analysis, a literature review of background information was completed. Intended to quickly acquaint the reader with a number of topics germane to this study, the literature review consisted of an overview of security assistance, historical U.S. interests and foreign policy in the Middle East, modern Egypt, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Soviet involvement in Egypt. Next, the methodology used in this study was discussed. Next, Chapter III provided a theoretical overview of historical research, specifically research design and analysis. Chapter III concluded with the specific methodology used in this study. Chapter IV presented a historical analysis of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations and their foreign policy towards the Middle East and Egypt. This chapter provides a conclusion to the research by answering the three investigative questions outlined in Chapter I and identifying the role U.S. foreign policy played in shaping Egypt's transition from Soviet military assistance to U.S. security assistance from 1969 through 1979.

What factors shaped U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East from 1969 to 1979?

Three interrelated factors shaped U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East from 1969 to 1979: countering Soviet influence in the region, reducing or eliminating the prospects of further Arab-Israeli conflict, and maintaining a secure, steady flow of oil from

the region for the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. sought to counter Soviet influence in the Middle East by providing a broad base of economic and military assistance to Israel and assisting moderate Arab and non-Arab nations in the region such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Countering Soviet influence in the region went beyond the bi-polar relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviets, who sought out and supplied arms and economic support to the more radical Arab states, were a destabilizing influence in the region and an obstacle to Arab-Israeli peace.

Brokering a permanent peace in the Middle East between the Arabs and Israelis would serve two purposes. First, a permanent peace between Israel and one or more Arab nations would decrease the need for Soviet arms transfers in the region and, as a result, Soviet influence. The Soviet Union had been a major supplier of arms to Egypt and Syria, the front line Arab states charged with carrying the war to the Israelis. Second, regional stability brought about by an Arab-Israeli peace settlement would help guarantee the flow of oil from the Middle East to the U.S. and its allies, minimizing the possibility of another devastating Arab oil embargo against the highly oil dependent economies of the U.S., Europe, and Japan.

The overriding factor influencing U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East was maintaining the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the West. The industrialized nations of the West were dependent on a steady flow of oil. Its availability, even with the four-fold price increases following the Yom Kippur War, was crucial to a healthy global economy. Decreasing Soviet influence in the region and negotiating an Arab-Israeli peace were key to ensuring the flow of oil to the U.S. and its allies.

What were the objectives of U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt from 1969 to 1979?

The preeminent goal of U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt from 1969 to 1979 was to wean Egypt away from the Soviet Union and into the United States sphere of influence.

This goal, somewhat unrealistic while Gamel Nasser served as Egyptian president, became attainable with Anwar Sadat's rise to the presidency. Nasser, an avid Arab nationalist, sought to unite the Arab world against Israel and the West. Nasser's posturing against Israel, America's close ally, led to Egypt receiving and becoming dependent on Soviet military aid. Sadat on the other hand, took a more conciliatory approach towards the United States and, eventually, Israel. First and foremost in Sadat's mind was the economic and territorial security of Egypt. Egypt received Soviet military aid and economic support from oil producing countries as long as it pursued an aggressive posture with Israel. This posture came at an enormous cost to Egypt's people and society as Egypt bore the brunt of four Arab-Israeli wars. The diplomacy and dialogue brought about by the Nixon Administration quest for an Arab-Israeli settlement provided Sadat the opportunity to break the costly addiction to Soviet military aid and pursue the stability brought about by peace with Israel. This dialogue continued through the Ford Administration. Carter's pursuit of Middle East peace, culminating in the Camp David accords, closed the door on Soviet economic and military aid to Egypt.

How did U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and Egypt shape security assistance to Egypt?

Security assistance was one of the "carrots" the U.S. used to pull Egypt from the Soviet camp into the Western camp. Early on, the Nixon administration identified assistance as one of the crucial tools for deterring aggression abroad and implementing the Nixon Doctrine. The effectiveness of U.S. security assistance to Israel, graphically illustrated to Egyptian leaders during the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War, served to amplify Egyptian dissatisfaction with the quality, quantity and cost of Soviet military aid. Nixon's desire to rebuild political relations with those Arab nations that had been severed following the 1967 Six Day War was not lost on Sadat. The promise of U.S. economic and military aid gained by working towards an Egyptian-Israeli settlement far

outweighed the potential gains of continuing with the status quo. As Egypt's posture towards Israel and the peace process became more positive, the possibilities of U.S. security assistance became more real. This possibility became reality with the Ford Administration's approval of six C-130 aircraft for Egypt.

Despite Carter's restrictive arms transfer policy and not having a clearly defined Middle East foreign policy, security assistance became central to the process of negotiating peace in the Middle East. Sadat's personal courage in seeking peace with Israel initially resulted in Egypt being ostracized in the Arab world. The psychological and political importance of U.S. supplied weapons and economic aid guaranteed Sadat that Egypt would have the security and stability needed to pursue the peace process. The transfer of "lethal" F-5Es provided in the 1978 "plane package" confirmed U.S. commitment to Egypt and the peace process. The $1.5 billion "peace treaty aid" authorized by Congress in 1979 signaled the beginning of long term U.S. security assistance to Egypt.

Conclusion

The factors shaping American foreign policy towards Egypt through three presidential administrations from 1969 through 1979 are essentially the same factors that had challenged previous administrations. First, U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt was shaped by the goal of countering Soviet influence. Next, American foreign policy was influenced by the desire to negotiate a permanent Middle East peace between the Arabs and the Israelis. Finally, foreign policy towards Egypt was influenced by the desire to ensure the flow of oil to the U.S. and the West.

U.S. diplomacy and dialogue in negotiating an Egyptian-Israeli peace resulted in the end to Soviet economic and military aid to Egypt. U.S. economic and military aid served as both reward and enticement as Egypt moved down the path to peace with Israel.

The trickle of U.S. security assistance became a torrent when Egypt signed a permanent peace treaty with Israel. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in 1979 signaled the end of the Soviet involvement in Egypt and the start of large scale security assistance from the United States.

Appendix A. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, 22 November 1967

The Security Council
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

> (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
>
> (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further the necessity*

> (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
>
> (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
>
> (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. (CQ, 1979: 67)

Appendix B. U.N. Security Council Resolution 338, 22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. *Calls* upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls* upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. (CQ, 1979: 68)

Appendix C. Key Features of the Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, 4 September 1975

In Geneva on September 4, 1975, Israel and Egypt formally signed a new Middle East accord, intended to provide another stepping-stone toward a final peace settlement between the Arab nations and Israel.

The key feature of the pact required the Israeli army to withdraw from the Sinai mountain passes of Gidi and Mitla. These areas were included in a new United Nations demilitarized zone. However, Israel still controlled 87 percent of the Sinai Peninsula, seized from Egypt in the 1967 war.

Egyptian forces were allowed to advance to the eastern edge of the old U.N. zone established by the January 1974 accord. Egypt recovered possession of the Abu Rudeis oil fields along the Gulf of Suez, also held by Israel since 1967.

Egypt pledged that it would not resort to the threat or use of force or continue a military blockage against Israel in the straits of Bab el Mandeb linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The Egyptians also agreed to a provision stating that "nonmilitary cargoes destined to or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal," opening the waterway to Israel for the first time since 1956.

Both belligerents pledged that "the conflict between them in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force, buy by peaceful means," and that they "are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations."

The agreement also limited military forces that each side was permitted to station adjacent to the U.N. buffer area, and called for the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission to be renewed annually rather than for shorter periods.

As for the new U.S. role, a few hundred American civilian personnel began monitoring Egyptian and Israeli activities in the Sinai. The agreement resulted in two warning stations operated separately by Egypt and Israel and three other stations in the Mitla and Gidi Passes manned by American technicians. (CQ, 1979: 41)

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This study sought to identify the role of U.S. foreign policy in shaping Egypt's transition from Soviet economic and military aid to U.S. security assistance from 1969 to 1979 and the factors shaping that transition. An historical analysis of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations and their foreign policy towards Egypt and the Middle East during the period in question was employed to complete this study. The researcher determined that U.S. diplomacy and dialogue in negotiating an Egyptian-Israeli peace resulted in the end to Soviet economic and military aid to Egypt. During the negotiating process, U.S. economic and military aid served as both reward and enticement as Egypt moved towards peace with Israel. The trickle of U.S. security assistance became a torrent when Egypt signed a permanent peace treaty with Israel. Signed in 1979, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signaled the end to Soviet involvement in Egypt and the beginning of large scale U.S. security assistance. The factors motivating three presidential administrations during this period were countering Soviet influence in the region, reducing or eliminating the prospects of further Arab-Israeli conflict, and maintaining a secure, steady flow of oil from the region for the U.S. and its allies.

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